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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUN 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
"filED IN OFFICE 
Q~ 
EZGREEN ASSOCIATES, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION, ) 
GP CELLULOSE LLC (FORMERLY) ) 
KOCH CELLULOSE, LLC), and ) 
BLUEYELLOW LLC, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
JUN 1 8 2010 
DEPUlY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
FULTON COUNlY GA 
Civil Action File No. 
2009-CV-168743 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On May 26, 2010, counsel appeared before the Court to present oral argument 
on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. After hearing the arguments made by 
counsel, and reviewing the briefs submitted on the motion and the record in the case, 
the Court finds as follows: 
I. Factual Background 
Don Moore, founder of Plaintiff EZGreen Associates, LLC ("EZG"), invented a 
system to grow grass using a cellulose-based fabric, seed, fertilizer, and other additives 
("engineered seed system" or "the Product"). On April 30, 2004, EZG and Georgia-
Pacific Corporation ("GP") entered into a contract permitting GP to manufacture, market, 
sell and distribute EZG's engineered seed system until June 30, 2014 ("the 
Agreement"). The Agreement obligated GP to use "commercially reasonable" efforts to 
market the Product. On May 12, 2008, GP sent EZG a one-page "termination letter," 
which EZG signed and returned. The termination letter stated that "[t]he Parties herby 
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agree to terminate the Agreement and all rights, obligations, and liabilities thereunder." 
In its Complaint, EZG alleges that Defendants breached the Agreement by failing to 
produce the Product and failing to use "commercially reasonable" efforts to market the 
Product during the years before the termination. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is premised on three arguments. 
First, Defendants contend that the termination letter is a release which bars any claims 
based on breach of the Agreement. Second, Defendants argue that the damages EZG 
seeks were not enumerated in the Agreement, and that even if they were, those 
damages are too speculative and uncertain to warrant recovery. Finally, Defendants 
contend that EZG failed to give notice of the alleged breach as required under the 
Agreement. 
II. Summary Judgment Standard 
A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-
11-56 when the moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be 
tried and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, 
warrant summary judgment as a matter of law. Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 
491,491 (1991). 
III. Release 
A release is governed by the same rules of construction as govern any written 
contract and, therefore, "is to be construed according to the intent of the parties." U.S. 
Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Industries, Inc., 264 Ga. 295, 298 (1994). "Since contracts 
must be construed according to the intention of the parties at the time of their execution, 
it will not be presumed that parties intend to contract away their legal rights in regard to 
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a subject matter not clearly appearing therein." lQ. Where no ambiguity exists in the 
language of a release, the court will interpret that language based on its plain meaning. 
O.C.GA § 13-2-3. 
The Court finds that the letter sent from GP to EZG On May 12, 2008, which EZG 
signed and returned and which stated that "[t]he Parties herby agree to terminate the 
Agreement and all rights, obligations, and liabilities thereunder" is unambiguously a 
termination of the parties' obligation to continue to perform the contract and nothing 
more. Therefore, EZG did not execute a release of any claims arising under the 
Agreement, and summary judgment on this basis is not warranted. 
IV. Damages 
Defendants attack the issue of damages on two fronts. First, Defendants argue 
that the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius precludes recovery of monetary 
damages because the Agreement did not explicitly provide for them. Second, 
Defendants argue that EZG cannot recover damages because those alleged damages 
are too uncertain. Both arguments fail. 
In dealing with the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio a/terius, great caution 
should be used. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. McFarley, 191 Ga. 334, 345-346 (1940). 
The maxim is "far from being a rule," and at best, it is a "description, after the fact, of 
what the court has discovered from context." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). 
Moreover, O.C.GA § 13-6-6 explicitly provides that every injured party in a breach of 
contract action has a right to damages. In other words, in a breach of contract action, 
once the plaintiff shows the existence of a legally enforceable contract and presents 
evidence from which a jury could find that defendant breached that contract, the 
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defendant is not entitled to summary judgment even if the plaintiff fails to present 
any admissible evidence to establish the amount of actual damages flowing from 
the breach. D.C.G.A. § 13-6-6; Eastview Healthcare, LLC v. Synertx, Inc., 296 Ga. 
App. 393, 398-399 (2009); Poe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1 F.Supp.2d 1472, 1477 
(1998)(applying Georgia law). Accordingly, the fact that the Agreement fails to list 
damages as a possible recovery for breach of the Agreement does not foreclose EZG's 
claims for breach of the Agreement. 
Defendants' argument that damages in this case are too uncertain is equally 
unpersuasive. D.C.G.A. § 13-6-2 provides that "damages recoverable for a breach of 
contract are such as arise naturally and according to the usual course of things from 
J . 
such breach and such as the parties contemplated, when the contract was made, as the 
probable result of its breach." Moreover, the Court finds that, while requiring proof and 
explanation, and while subject to the rigors of cross examination and the rules of 
evidence, the damages EZG seeks could "be proved with reasonable certainty." 
Graham Bros.' Const. Co., Inc. v. C. W. Matthews Contracting Co., Inc.,159 Ga. App. 
546 (1981). Thus, summary judgment based on this argument is also improper. 
V. Notice 
GP argues that EZG failed to comply with the notice provision of the Agreement, 
thereby barring a breach of contract claim. Paragraph 7.3(a) of the Agreement 
provides, in relevant part: 
"[I]f EZGreen believes that GP has not made a commercially reasonable 
effort ... , then EZG by written notice to GP may within thirty days .. .identify 
the specific performance criteria upon which EZG's notice is based. [If GP 
has not cured within 90 days], EZG may then amend the provisions of 
this Article ... " (emphasis added). 
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(J At no point does the Agreement require EZG to give notice. When the language of a 
contract is unambiguous, the court will enforce the contract's clear terms. Caswell v. 
Anderson, 241 Ga. App. 703, 704 (2000). The word "may" as used in this Agreement 
shows that notice under Paragraph 7.3(a) was permissive, not mandatory. Thus, the 
Agreement gave EZG the option to give GP notice of an alleged breach; it did not 
require such notice. 
Even if the Agreement were construed as requiring EZG to give notice of an 
alleged breach to GP, EZG did so in the form of a letter dated January 27, 2006, 
alleging that GP had failed to make "commercially reasonable efforts" to market the 
Product. 
VI. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
DENIED. The stay of discovery ordered on March 31, 2010 is hereby lifted. Discovery 
in this case shall close on Friday, September 17,2010. 
SO ORDERED this 18th day of June, 2010. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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Copies to: 
Counsel for Plaintiff: 
Andrew H. Stuart 
Stuart Law Group, LLC 
1775 The Exchange, Suite 130 
Atlanta, GA 30339 
Thomas C. Jessee 
Jessee & Jessee 
P.O. Box 997 
Johnson City, TN 37605 
Thomas D. Dossett 
Todd & Dossett, P.C. 
134 West Center Street 
Kingsport, TN 37660 
Counsel for Defendants: 
Chamberlain Hrdlicka 
Gary S. Freed 
David N. Dreyer 
191 Peachtree Street, N.E. 
Thirty-Fourth Floor 
Atlanta, GA 30303-1747 
404-659-1410 
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